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1 
 
If ethos is the word for our previous issue of Poroi (3, 2, December, 
2004), pathos is the word for this one.  Pathos appeals to passions; 
it stirs sentiments; it mobilizes emotions.  All the essays in this 
sixth issue analyze public forms and personal capacities of pathos.  
Together they argue powerfully for greater attention to political 
aesthetics, particularly in coming to terms with public arguments.  
These reach from cultures to technologies and from campaigns to 
sciences. 
 
 
2 
 
The Poroi Symposium on Urban Rhetorics of Race is a project of 
James Throgmorton, who specializes in urban and regional 
planning.  Situating himself in a nexus of comparisons between 
Louisville in America and Berlin in Germany, Throgmorton 
complements his planning perspectives with literary reflections 
from Christine Gerhardt and communication considerations 
from Leslie Hahner.  All three emphasize politics of race and 
ethnicity, and all three show these constructed through rhetorics 
more ample in pathos and ethos than logos.  Gerhardt addresses 
how Americans have experienced Berlin as a site of racial conflict 
before and after the Wall came tumbling down.  Hahner explores 
how Louisville is trying to use its new Muhammad Ali Center to 
hide its own history of racial division, one that the Center would do 
better to face.  Throgmorton ties the Gerhardt and Hahner 
accounts into a tale of two museums that reveals how racialization 
continues in current cultures. 
 
 
3 
 
Modern epistemologies portray pathos as appealing to our 
sympathy, while late-modern aesthetics display pathos as 
engaging our empathy.  But from philosophy and communication, 
David Depew explains how the postmodern turn away from 
empathy shows it to be a residual “repair concept.”  It was to do 
the work that “sympathy” no longer can; yet even “empathy” has 
since come to be rejected in aesthetics.  This Depew thesis initiates 
a Poroi Symposium on Word Tours of Empathy.  From literary and 
cinematic criticism, Russell Scott Valentino follows some of the 
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same fault lines.  His rattle erratically back from literary realism in 
the nineteenth century to Shakespeare, even while implicating 
Bahktin and Nabokov in the twentieth.  Along the way, Valentino 
shows, we may find useful principles for reading, criticizing, and 
translating literature. 
 
4 
 
Television is the topic for rhetorician Bruce Gronbeck.  He 
defends sentimental images as major resources for political 
communication in America.  Tapping Adam Smith on sympathy, 
Gronbeck ranges across televised speeches, convention videos, and 
campaign spots to show how passionate pictures can construct 
good politics.  He turns the tables on critics of television by tracing 
how visualized emotions connect people patriotically, celebrate 
identities communally, and help us take politics personally.  
Gronbeck’s contention is that current politics need pathos for 
reasons practical, theoretical, but especially ethical. 
 
 
5 
 
The ensuing argument, my contribution to this conversation, 
reminds us that pathos is reasoning.  The modern injunction is 
not to be carried away by feelings.  The idea is to step back from 
undue engagement in any setting, from heated passions of the 
moment, and the postmodern multiversity continues to embrace 
this academic ideal.  Yet public arguments present a different 
picture of pathos.  They show us how moral and other practical 
judgments are passionate.  To direct – let alone induce – action, 
they fill us as much with feeling as information.  Or better, they fill 
us with feeling as information, and information as feeling.  
Moreover they encourage us to assess our situations through 
diverse complexes of emotion rather than one mode only of cool 
calculation for efficient means to given interests.  As examples of 
public arguments, political advertisements on television help 
indicate how there are multiple rationalities for politics.  They also 
show how each political rationality is, in important part, a distinct 
form of pathos.  Then we can learn how to call on modern, 
instrumental rationality alone is to lose many of our arguments, 
much of our minds, and most of ourselves. 
 
 
 
 Public Arguments  
 
 
 
An excess of reason is itself a form of madness. 
                 Kim Stanley Robinson (2004, p. 244)  
 
6 
 
In the church of reason, logos is king (Pirsig 1974).  Here the 
metaphors aren’t so much mixed as matched.  The academy, the 
university, the multiversity:  all seek to exclude modes of argument  
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other than the strictly rational, and all define rationality as 
intellection or cognition by contrast with passion.  Reason is not 
emotion, imagination, volition, reputation, even narration.  
Neither pathos, ethos, mythos, nor tropos need apply (Nelson 
1998, pp. 99-149).  Science is the height of civilization; and science 
is fact and logic, not value or invention. 
 
7 
 
The trouble with this fantasy is that facts are made, logics are 
many, and scientists are humans:  individually embodied and 
working best in communities of inquiry complete with politics 
aplenty.  In fact, rhetorics rule:  cognition is hot; reasoning is 
motivated, even in science; and our diverse rationalities are 
networks of feeling, figure, and story as well as information or 
logic (Nelson 1983; Lodge 1995).  The need is now to make room in 
accounts of argumentation and reasoning for the many elements 
that modern rationalities – cool, abstracted, disembodied, 
streamlined, strategic – sometimes omit (Frank 1988). 
 
 
8 
 
Public arguments are important places to recognize all this, so that 
standards for proof and notions of reason keep pace with 
technologies of communication and devices of persuasion.  
Scientific arguments are public in a limited sense:  open to any 
who can address them.  Political arguments are public in a larger 
sense:  addressed to any who open to them.  And both kinds of 
public arguments are becoming multimediated.  In classes, 
conventions, laboratories, and online journals, science is becoming 
multimedia scholarship.  The PowerPoint slides, aural data, visual 
models, and virtual-reality devices are intrinsic to doing science in 
the twenty-first century.  The screens, sounds, and simulations of 
film, television, and computers are crucial for the century’s 
deliberations, elections, movements, and regulations.  Ours are 
becoming multimedia politics.  These can be fuller in body and 
better at feeling than more constricted media or politics. 
 
 
9 
 
How should we treat public arguments in multimediated times?  
Not in the ways we have been trying to assess political spots on 
television.  Political telespots are a fast-evolving frontier of public 
arguments in the larger sense.  To evaluate them, the academy and 
the media are invoking pseudo-scientific criteria of “logical” 
argument or anti-political norms of “rational” persuasion.  These 
impose impossible canons of “truth,” unfortunate strictures 
against “distortion,” foolish requirements for “information,” and 
misbegotten ideas of “judgment.”  Especially they strive to exclude 
emotions from public arguments.  We would do better to welcome 
the inevitability of emotion along with its indispensability for 
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information, judgment, and reason as well as action. 
 
10 
 
To help appreciate this, we can examine the uses of emotions as 
reasons in polispots.  These uses show how being rational in public 
arguments is being adequately emotional.  The passions of others 
can be good, valid reasons for their public claims.  Therefore 
polispots take care to display the emotions of candidates, critics, 
endorsers, and more.  Our own feelings also can become reasons 
for public arguments, so effective ads often provoke appropriate 
emotions in viewers.  Media commentators and scholars 
mistakenly treat both sites and sets of emotion as manipulations 
that short-circuit rationality rather than complete it.  Yet how 
emotions can work as reasons in public arguments becomes 
especially in clear in such multimedia argumentation.  Modern 
rationalities favor words, logos, largely uninflected text.  Telespots 
add genres, images, voices, musics, and other sounds.  As public 
arguments, political ads on television can be good at 
communicating emotions as reasons. 
 
 
 
 Modern Rationality  
 
 
 
Dispassionate; sensible; calm; reasonable. 
A thinking machine. 
        Kim Stanley Robinson (2004, p. 248)  
 
11 
 
The modern, western dichotomy between reason and emotion can 
be more misleading than helpful, especially in parsing political 
communication.  Campaign spots on television are no exception.  
They demonstrate how prominent emotional appeals are in 
political persuasion.  They indicate how implausible it can be to 
separate information from emotion.  They show how emotions can 
be intrinsic to political reasoning.  And they suggest how distinct 
kinds of politics can be political rationalities that amount in some 
respects to different complexes of emotions. 
 
 
12 
 
To this point, studies of emotions within political communication 
in general or televised advertising in particular tend to take one or 
more of four approaches.  They ignore emotions as irrelevant for 
cognition or secondary for reasoning (Graber 1988; Biocca 1991).  
They condemn emotions as markers of propaganda (Jowett 1986; 
Combs 1993).  They distrust emotions as signs of manipulation 
that disrupt reasoning or depress participation (Jamieson 1992; 
Ansolabehere 1995).  Or they defend emotions as forces of 
motivation that engage citizens, activate vigilance, and facilitate 
persuasion (Huddy 2000; Brader 2005).  Across all these 
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approaches, though, the shared assumption is that emotions as 
modes of passion (at least should) remain categorically discrete 
from data or information as claims of fact and reasons or warrants 
as claims of logic. 
 
13 
 
The premise is common among modern epistemologists, survey 
researchers, cognitive experimentalists, neurobiologists, even 
political rhetoricians.  Modern philosophers dualize mind and 
body, then place reason in mind and emotion in body (Damasio 
1994).  Surveyers identify feelings with values in contrast to facts, 
logics, or ideas (Nelson 1977).  Cognitionists treat emotions as tags 
somehow separable from factual or logical contents of experience 
and intellection (Fiske 1991).  Neurologists localize fields of brain 
function to contrast ratiocination of various sorts with emotions of 
several kinds (Damasio 1999, 2003).  From Aristotle (1991) 
onward, rhetoricians segment persuasion into logos as logics or 
topics, ethos as authority or credibility, plus pathos as passion or 
emotion. 
 
 
14 
 
The vague but pervasive implication is that emotions are illogical 
and unscientific.  By most definitions, they are non-rational; by 
many irrational; by some anti-rational.  Inquiry and judgment 
should avoid them:  better to think like a machine than feel like a 
human, if accuracy and validity are at stake.  If cognition proceeds 
largely and appropriately apart from emotions, moreover, so 
should communication – at least when we must get something 
right, whether in the academy or the polity.  To cull the wheat from 
the chaff of political ads means stripping the emotions aside to test 
for the kernels of truth in claims about plans, policies, or 
performances.  Thus the ad watches inspired by scholarship on 
political communication police distortions far more than they sort 
through passions, even though they presumably would treat 
emotions as distortions if they were to give feelings frontal 
attention (Jamieson 1992, 2000; West 1992, 2001). 
 
 
 
 Ad Watches  
 
 
 
I believed instead that the rational spirit should not 
indulge such passion, but feed only on the Truth . . . 
                                            Umberto Eco (1983, p. 15)  
 
15 
 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, some scholars joined 
hands with journalists from print and television to police those 
public arguments we know as campaign telespots.  The premise 
has been that political ads, especially on television, will play fast 
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and loose with the truth unless checked by an outside power.  The 
implication is that the images, voices, and musics of political spots 
lend themselves to distortions of reason and manipulations of 
emotion that traduce public judgment of candidates and causes.  
Viewers cannot defend themselves against such propaganda, 
except by a pervasive cynicism that corrodes representative 
politics.  Competitors can counter smears by opponents only when 
campaign money distributes itself more evenly than usual, and 
even then the result is less an effective correction of claims or 
assignment of responsibilities than a diffuse public cynicism about 
all politicians.  Notwithstanding complaints that the press already 
plays too great a role in selecting candidates, the insistence has 
become that the press referee electoral contests, particularly the 
contents of political spots on television (Patterson 1980, 1993). 
 
16 
 
There are many ways to tell the story of standards for political ads 
as public arguments.  Some accounts start even before the 
American advent of televised campaign spots in 1950, but a more 
recent story should suffice here.  It tells how George H. W. Bush 
won the 1988 presidential election in the summer of that year 
when Roger Ailes unleashed a barrage of attacks ads against 
Michael Dukakis.  These spots undid a seventeen-point lead in 
opinion polls by defining a little-known Dukakis as pro-crime, pro-
tax, anti-military, and anti-environment.  For weeks, neither a 
stunned Dukakis nor a neutral press did much in response 
(Galston 1989).  By the time Dukakis and the press objected to the 
Bush attacks as outrageous misrepresentations, their protestations 
were too little and too late.  Clever lies, potent images, and sinister 
sounds had mobilized voters to doubt Dukakis just where 
journalists and scholars knew Dukakis to be strong and Bush weak 
(Jamieson 1992, pp. 3-9). 
 
 
17 
 
’Twould be a shame, the call came, for the press to let this happen 
again.  Scions of the establishment press such as David Broder 
(1990) and Paul Taylor (1990a, 1990b) roused their colleagues to 
generate ad watches in print and truth squads on television.  As 
Dean of Penn’s Annenberg School of Communication, Kathleen 
Hall Jamieson (1992, pp. 15-159) has coached telejournalists on 
video techniques to police truth in political advertising yet avoid 
inadvertent “news ads” that can yield big and uncritical audiences 
for the worst in mud and distortion.  Now as Director of Penn’s 
Annenberg Public Policy Center, she has sponsored a Web site that 
checks truth claims for political spots and speeches.  Any number 
of journalists and scholars have added to the hue and cry against 
“negative ads;” and many have contributed to print or TV reviews 
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of spots for their factual inaccuracy, invitations to misinference, 
and sensational attacks (Alter 1990; Kurtz 1996).  Elections from 
1990 onward have included myriad “mud squads,” “reality checks,” 
“ad zappers,” and the like in newspapers, news magazines, 
morning shows, news broadcasts, and pundit programs.  Let it not 
be said that determined scholars and journalists never concert 
themselves to make any real difference in public affairs.  The ad 
police have made themselves a staple in American elections. 
 
18 
 
Even some of the initial advocates of ad watches have developed 
hesitations about their effects (Jamieson 2001, pp. 121-122).  The 
intention was to make spots more truthful and citizens more 
informed.  Along the way, there probably has been the hope that 
ad watches would help contributors and voters punish the worst 
offenders by redirecting donations and votes to other candidates.  
Yet sometimes the ad watches seem counterproductive.  Although 
taking visual and verbal care to “distance” viewers from the pieces 
of spots they show, ad watches still can create powerful “news ads” 
from particularly colorful offenders (Jamieson 1992, pp. 121-159).   
Sometimes the news makes these reverberate for days or weeks 
throughout the media as echo chambers.  What happened in 2004 
with the notorious Swift Boat spots is a clear case in point.  Often 
ad watches lack the conceptual or informational resources to come 
to decent terms with the spots they review (Nelson 1997, pp. 29-
32; Ansolabehere 1996).  The ad watches aggravate the overall 
climate of cynicism about politics promoted of late in American 
news (Richardson 2003, pp. 89-109).  And by ignoring most 
dynamics of political communication, the ad watches seldom help 
people understand how spots actually work (Nelson 1997, pp. 58-
69).  Among the dynamics given short shrift by ad watches are the 
emotions spurred and tapped by telespots. 
 
 
 
 Political Reasoning  
 
 
 
Reason only functions when the emotions are involved. 
                                                  John le Carré (1996, p. 91)  
 
19 
 
Even the chief architect of modern rationality, David Hume, 
insisted that emotion and imagination are indispensable to 
reason.  This is the Hume of cool, dispassionate judgment, the one 
who gave us the modern dichotomy between is and ought, fact and 
value (1739-40).  This is Hume the cognitivist, who invented the 
idea of rational judgment as “proper discernment” by an idealized, 
“disinterested spectator” practiced in critical reflection (1777).  
Nonetheless Hume explained that the merit of the matter emerges 
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for critical discernment through vivid activity of the imagination.  
It brings objects of judgment fully before the mind’s rational-I.  It 
does this so that the rational judge experiences objects adequately, 
hence feels them accurately.  The feelings are emotions.  Upon 
proper discernment, how in detail might I approve or disapprove 
objects?  What specific sentiments does each evoke in me?  Reason 
and sentiment must concur, Hume wrote.  That is because our 
reasons must include our emotions when we take care to 
experience objects amply, adequately, properly.  Warranted 
judgments in public arguments depend for Hume on emotions as 
reasons.  Disproportionate feelings can overwhelm us, and 
improperly provoked emotions can misinform us.  Yet humans are 
not computers, even when it comes to reasoning (Nesbitt 1980; 
Billig 1989).  Therefore increasing our capacity for emotion 
enhances our ability to reason. 
 
20 
 
Re-enter polispots.  Scholars have been surprised to learn that 
citizens get more ample and effective campaign information from 
political ads than televised news (Graber 1988; Jamieson 2000).  
Both outdistance print.  Consistent with Hume, political 
cognitionists acknowledge that the multimedia combination of 
audio, video, and verbiage activates more senses as channels for 
more information (Graber 2001).  Likewise all of us can recognize 
that audiovisual experiences augment imagination more 
extensively than print does when bringing objects adequately 
before the bar of judgment.  But these are advantages of television, 
holding for spots and news.  Why do polispots surpass newscasts 
as sources of relevant and remembered information for voters?  
Why don’t the news ethos of impartiality and logos of complication 
generate more information and better reasoning? 
 
 
21 
 
Ads typically have higher production values than news.  The 
superior sights, sounds, and words probably boost the impact of 
polispots.  Yet the contrast is clearer for commercials, which get 
the lion’s share per minute of production money and talent.  A 
bigger advantage for polispots is in timing (West 2001).  Newscasts 
detail candidates and issues early in campaigns, when voters are 
inattentive, then resist doubling back because old news is no 
longer news.  Ads come throughout campaigns and cluster at their 
height, when and where attention is greatest.  Around the clock 
and across the dial, polispots disperse and repeat themselves far 
more than newscasts.  Frequency and repetition improve 
retention, recognition, and ratiocination.  But the biggest edge of 
polispots over telenews is in pathos.  News stays neutral in 
elections, whereas ads emote.  Or more specifically, news dampens 
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passions.  It turns them toward the cool, calm, and collected 
complex of modern rationality in order to stay respectable as 
reporting events and analyzing facts.  Political ads, by contrast, 
mobilize emotions that are many and varied to attain persuasion 
by promoting sentiments and instructing judgments.  This is just 
as Hume and other philosophers of reason would want; it is just as 
we should appreciate. 
 
22 
 
Newscasts mainly tell but also show elections, typically from an 
emotional distance.  Ads mostly dramatize campaigns, engaging 
and informing our passions.  Therefore telespots deliver vicarious, 
virtual, and symbolical experiences of the candidates, supporters, 
opponents, topics, and more.  These modes of experiential 
persuasion help us figure out how to feel about their performances 
and priorities:  a crucial step in reasoning what to do (Nelson 1997, 
pp. 195-232).  Emotions also move us to act on the resulting 
judgments, when polispot passions push us past thresholds of 
indifference.  On the whole, though, the pathos of ads probably 
overcomes weak will far less than it helps us reason in the first 
place. 
 
 
 
 Emotional Functions  
 
 
 
Emotions are an essential part of the ability to reason. 
                                                Doris Graber (2001, p. 37)  
 
23 
 
Reasons are not the only roles for emotions in telepots.  
Particularly by music or tone of voice at the beginnings of ads, 
feelings like those aroused by fanfares activate viewer attention.  
Especially toward the ends, emotions also move viewers to action 
(Nelson 2004d).  Admonished in 1972 that “The people are paying 
for this campaign with their hard-earned dollars,” you viewers 
were to be moved by feelings of solidarity and guilt to “send what 
you can to McGovern for President.”   From Eisenhower onward, 
telespots play upbeat music or show happy parades to help people 
experience climbing onto the candidate’s bandwagon.  Finally, 
telespot passions do sometimes replace, prevent, or pervert 
reasoning.  Jamieson (1992) specifies this for the “visceral” 
feelings mobilized by Bush spots in 1988.  These three roles for 
telespot emotions have been studied through analyses, 
experiments, focus groups, surveys, and more.  But the further 
roles of emotions as reasons in telespots have gone largely 
unrecognized. 
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First, major claims about candidates require emotions for 
evidence.  Do candidates “care deeply” about education or 
employment?  Are candidates “outraged” about crimes or taxes?  
By voices, gestures, and musics, telespots have candidates enact 
emotions to warrant such claims, as well as show their sincerity or 
certify their promises.  Bad ads argue against themselves in these 
ways.  Paul Tsongas trumpeted himself in 1992 as “the 
environmental candidate for president,” but the funereal black-
and-white of his telespot argued against optimism for his 
environmental program.  Green-and-white, Paul Wellstone’s iconic 
bus felt clean and bright to corroborate his anti-corruption, pro-
environment credentials (Szasz 1994; Boynton 1995, 1996, 1997; 
Nelson 1997; DeLuca 1999). 
 
 
25 
 
Similar considerations hold for testimonials.  Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
wooden endorsement of JFK in 1960 impugns itself.  Likewise the 
man-on-the-street recitations in 1968 for Hubert Humphrey 
counter-evidence by stilted vocal tones their claim that “these are 
critical times for America.”  By contrast, Ronald Reagan’s 1976 
telespot for Gerald Ford carries conviction as a vehement attack on 
Jimmy Carter. 
 
 
26 
 
Second, polispots must mobilize emotions for viewers even to 
comprehend many claims, a prerequisite for presenting or 
assessing evidence.  Comprehension depends on what the Greeks 
named mimesis, the middle ages called imitatio, and the modern 
epistemologists reconstruct as representation (Auerbach 1953; 
Scarry 1994; Nelson 2004c).  Reagan’s 1984 spots contended it 
was “morning again in America.”  What did that mean?   To 
understand the claim, viewers needed to feel new political days 
dawning.  The spots are renowned for promoting emotions of pride 
and refreshment through lush, filtered colors and richly 
orchestrated music.  “Imagine,” two 1988 spots directed, the 
utopia from a Dukakis presidency that knows “the best America is 
yet to come.”  What could that mean?  The spots specify their 
instruction by having viewers experience in participatory close-ups 
and heroic slow-motion a set of scenes similar to Reagan’s four 
years before. 
 
 
27 
 
When telespot emotions fail to mime or represent for viewers the 
contents of claims, spots confuse viewers.  The black humor of the 
1988 “Packaging of the President” spots against Bush managed to 
escape viewers who contacted the Bush campaign to complain 
about baffling ads.  The stentorian voiceover for the primary 
version of “A Town Called Hope” emoted pride, not hope, and the 
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Clintonites used the candidate’s warm voiceover to remake the 
spot for the general election.  Dole ran a 1996 spot with no sound 
effects that wondered mildly, “Do you really know Steve Forbes?”  
When the same pictures and voiceover ran in a second spot with 
sound effects from horror, viewers could recognize the question as 
a devastating indictment. 
 
28 
 
Third, emotions make logical connections in some telespots.  Vote 
against incumbents, an ad argues, because they’re allowing huge 
deficits.  What is the logical link, the suppressed premise?  Big 
deficits are bad because they harm people.  A notorious lesson 
from the 1980s onward is that such words do not make the 
connection for many people.  Bolster the words with statistics 
about impacts on interest rates or economic activities, and the 
connection remains insecure.  Add a debt sign with numbers 
racing upward, and people experience that deficits aggravate debt, 
but they do not yet sense the harm in this.  A persistent challenge 
for political advertisers has been to mobilize the emotions that 
make the link between deficits and injuries. 
 
 
29 
 
Vocal devices of worry, anger, scorn, and such seldom work.  Spots 
for Walter Mondale in 1984 had recourse to horror music from the 
Halloween movies to help people feel the monster debt lurking, 
growing, coming to get them.  But the breakthrough acknowledged 
by advertisers did not happen until 2003 when a spot about 
“Child’s Play” won wide MoveOn.org sponsorship by  showing how 
iconic children in the near future would work at menial jobs in 
coming to terms with the cross-generational consequences of 
ballooning deficits by the federal government.  The organization 
followed in 2004 with a couple of parallel spots that dress seniors 
in service garb to perform menial work way past the time for 
retirement because a broke government cannot pay for Medicare, 
Social Security, and such.  Logical connections not felt are 
connections not made. 
 
 
30 
 
The western ties between logos and the eyes mean that 
visualization is the main telespot tool for making logical 
connections through emotions (Jay 1993; Huddy 2000).  This is 
the kind of emotive imagination that Hume recognized as crucial 
for reasoning.  Words often visualize.  Environmentalists need to 
help people reason in micrograms and other quantities remote 
from everyday discourse, so they resort to rhetorical devices like 
PATEOTS, the period at the end of this sentence.  As an activist 
says, “a microgram is about equal to one PATEOTS.  A part per 
million is a drop in a railway tank car – that’s what the chemical 
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companies always say, to make it sound less dangerous.  If all the 
baby seals killed last year are laid end to end, they would span a 
hundred football fields.  The tears shed by the mommy seals would 
fill a tank car.  The volume of raw sewage going into the Harbor 
could fill a football stadium every week” (Stephenson 1988, p. 22).  
At times, video visualizes even more vividly.  Add sounds, and 
telespots approach full-bodied, virtual realities that can make 
information and emotion more accurate and adequate for 
judgment (Nelson 2000). 
 
31 
 
Fourth, emotions help define and defend key terms in political 
arguments.  Is the nuclear bomb for fighting ordinary wars?  Hear 
the indignant narrator in 1964 deliver Barry Goldwater’s answer 
that it is “just another weapon.”  Does the scorn feel appropriate?  
Then you would reasonably resist defining nuclear warheads as 
conventional weapons, and you would have a good reason to vote 
for Lyndon Johnson.  But if not, not or worse.  Mandy Grunwald 
explained on C-SPAN that many anti-Clinton spots made by Alex 
Castellanos for Bob Dole in 1996 offered scorn, outrage, and 
hatred sharable only by a small part of the electorate.  The focus 
groups and surveys she saw showed that few people accepted the 
argumentative terms of those spots, because their feelings were 
not the same.  The spots did reinforce right-wingers in their 
political terms as in their loathing of Clinton.  Going over the top, 
however, the spots also reinforced most other viewers in their 
distrust of Dole as a sharp-tongued, immoderate candidate.  Or so 
Grunwald interpreted the evidence available to her. 
 
 
32 
 
That emotions work as reasons explains the most enduring finding 
about political ads:  that they reinforce previous dispositions of 
viewers toward candidates.  Emotions performed or provoked by 
telespots that feel appropriate provide reasons to approve the 
candidate.  Telespot emotions that feel inappropriate provide 
reasons to disapprove.  Yet how telespot emotions feel depend in 
significant ways on viewers’ prior feelings and judgments about the 
candidate.  In a decently reasonable fashion, viewers become likely 
to resonate emotionally with spots for the candidates, with whom 
they already have shared experiences and judgments, while 
viewers are likely to feel irritated by emotions promoted by spots 
for opponents. 
 
 
33 
 
Many other dynamics inform reasoned responses to political 
advertising.  Nonetheless this specifically emotional component in 
political reasoning is understandably (and defensibly) strong 
enough to surface weakly overall in media-effects research, when 
 
John S. Nelson 13 Poroi, 4, 1, March, 2005 
the others do not.  Surely the most dispassionately analytical of 
scholars experience some resistance to emotions recommended by 
opposition spots, no matter how cogent and clever.  Not 
unreasonably, these scholars also resist kinds of politics that are 
not their own (Nelson 1977).  Yet such contrasting kinds of politics 
are different rationalities for politics, and these in turn can be 
distinct complexes of emotions. 
 
 
 Political Rationalities  
 
 
 
If too much reason was a form of madness, 
then perhaps passionate reason was what was called for. 
                                   Kim Stanley Robinson (2004, p. 250)  
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Postmodern people have particularly strong reasons to regard 
rationality and reason as implicitly plural nouns.  Thus rhetorical 
theorists of the good-reasons school take all persuasion to appeal 
to many reasons (Booth 1970, 1988; Perelman 1969, 1982; 
Toulmin 1964, 1970).  That there are many reasons means that 
there are many rationales:  there are many reasonable ways to 
think through experiences and challenges to action.  Yet this 
means that there are multiple rationalities.  For many purposes, as 
already suggested, the modern, instrumental, technical rationality 
of calculating efficient means to given ends should be conceived as 
a distinctive complex of emotions and images.  It is cool 
(dispassionate, impersonal) reason – in the many senses of that 
word.  But the reverse holds as well:  each complex of emotion, 
imagination, and cognition can be practiced as a specific mode of 
reasoning. 
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Historically there have been several of these styles unto 
rationalities within western politics:  bureaucratic, courtly, realist, 
and republican (Hariman 1995).  In modern times, each political 
ideology provides a logic of ideas that amounts to a distinctive 
rationality for politics (Nelson 1977, 1980).  In European terms, 
these include authoritarianism, liberalism, socialism, 
conservatism, fascism, anarchism, and more.  In moving into 
postmodern times, we augment those modern ideologies with 
further forms (and just not contents) of political ratiocination:  
environmentalism, existentialism, feminism, perfectionism, etc. 
(Nelson 1998, pp. 205-230).  These function as different 
rationalities for politics.  They cultivate different complexes of 
experience, emotion, imagination, and cognition.  Hence they 
make different connections. 
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Even if we were to focus on the hardboiled, instrumental 
rationality that modern idea-logics can be argued to share, we 
would learn that postmodern politics depart from idea-logics in 
favor of other, richer, softer, warmer, more substantive, differently 
directed and constrained reasoning.  Modern rationalities for 
politics are primarily conductive, deductive, inductive, and 
reductive; whereas postmodern rationalities are far more 
abductive (Hanson 1965; Rawls 1971, 1996), coductive (Booth 
1988), retroductive (Hanson 1969a, 1969b), and seductive 
(Baudrillard 1990).  Modern rationalities pursue Newtonian, 
billiard-ball causation; postmodern rationalities stress non-linear 
systems with sensitive dependence and butterfly effects (Gleick 
1987, 1990).  Modern rationalities correlate independent and 
dependent variables; postmodern rationalities measure chaotic 
flows and tipping points (Hayles 1991; Gladwell 2002).  Modern 
rationalities seek leverage for the control and domination of 
nature; even as their politics use governments, interest groups, 
and parties to leverage societies from outside.  Postmodern 
rationalities diffuse, infuse, and overflow ecosystems; just as their 
movements turn politics into ethics, rhetorics, and aesthetics for 
direct action inside societies (Nelson 2004c).  And all the while, 
pre-modern kinds of political rationality such as republicanism 
linger or return as alternatives too (Roelofs 1976). 
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Sometimes we can miss this in the American fascination with 
placing politics on a single spectrum of ideological positions from 
Left to Right.  This is possible mainly because Americans have 
subscribed mostly to variants of one modern ideology for politics.  
In European terms, this  is liberalism or liberal democracy (Reid 
1972, 1974; Holsworth 1987).  In the parlance of political theorists, 
this is liberalism with a small- l.  It regards government as a 
necessary evil, it stresses individual rights, and it celebrates private 
life.  In addition to American, large- L, “Liberalism” on the “Left,” 
this even includes the Moderate middle of the road and most of 
what Americans call “Conservatism” on the “Right.”  For these 
differ mainly on which decisions to make public or leave private.  
The United States has been so homogeneous in its singular 
political ideology that scholars can slip into thinking that there is 
only one political rationality, defined in purely formal terms of 
logos that exclude all pathos and can process any sort of political 
content. 
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That one-ideology era might be ending for America’s official 
politics, the high politics of state (Wills 1969).  Even if not, 
comparisons to other countries and cultures disclose additional  
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ideologies for politics.  Increasing attention to cultural and 
movement politics within the United States also raises awareness 
of other rationalities that operate more obviously outside the state 
(Cohen 1985; Luke 1989; Nimmo 1990; Fieschi 2004).  Yet 
political spots on television show that politics beyond those of 
liberal democracy make prominent appearances in American 
elections.  To see this, we need to sidestep the mainstream 
paradigm for studying ads.  Rather than target their consequences 
for voting, in terms of turnout or victors, we do well to examine 
campaign spots for the various politics that they make available 
(Nelson 2004a, 2004b). 
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The United States was founded as a republic, and the politics of 
republics linger in daily conduct as well as governing institutions.  
Yet the country rapidly became so liberal in ideology that 
competing logics of ideas never gained much traction, and liberal 
individualism in the U.S. soon appropriated sentiments along with 
some devices of democracy that celebrate deference to ordinary 
people in collective modes of voice (Nelson 2001).  So it is 
understandable that liberal politics of representation have 
dominated the discipline of political science, its conceptions of 
American politics, and its studies of campaign spots.  The 
academic mania for media effects is one result (Nelson 2004a).  
Liberalism downplays the importance of immaterial symbols and 
other communications, aside from their impact on the behavior of 
human individuals, especially their votes in elections and their 
opinions for surveys. 
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Notwithstanding empirical and analytical explanations that 
plurality contests in single-member districts cannot confer 
representational mandates, almost all election research focuses on 
candidate representation of voter interests (Dahl 2001).  Thus 
studies of election ads feature the liberal politics of taking or 
criticizing “positions on issues” (Jamieson 1984; West 2001).  The 
complaints against attack ads worry not only that they depress 
turnout but that they obscure or distort issue positions (Johnson-
Cartee 1991; Jamieson 2000).  Hence researchers have worked 
mainly to specify ad effects on citizen preferences for policies or 
candidates. 
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The trouble is not that the liberal paradigm makes no sense for 
American elections; it is that even American campaigns turn 
importantly on politics beyond liberalism.  Every position on the 
American spectrum of Left-Center-Right is a version of European 
liberalism inflected by American senses of democracy.  Yet 
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historians and theorists notice a fundamentally wider field of 
ideologies in America, encompassing conservatism and socialism 
as well as liberalism (Ball 1999; Heywood 2003).   Rhetoricians see 
in America’s popular culture a range of political styles that include 
realism, bureaucratism, and republicanism (Hariman 1995).  
Political sociologists recognize in America’s civil society diverse 
movement politics of feminism, environmentalism, populism, and 
more (Cohen 1985; Dryzek 2002; Fieschi 2004; Tarrow 1994). 
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Various political movements, styles, and ideologies not only can 
but often do surface in campaign ads.  There they promote 
distinctive emotions and appeal to rationalities constructed by 
politics different from liberalism.  Thus presidential ads for the 
2000 general election proved remarkably populist – as well as 
liberal – in their visual and verbal devices, while their voices were 
strongly republican in style.  Then ads for the 2004 caucuses 
extended the prominence of populism into voicing as well (Nelson 
2004b). 
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Current republicanism in the United States has no special 
connection to the GOP, which has become far more committed to 
tenets of ideology featured by liberalism and conservatism in 
European terms.  Therefore republicanism persists less in 
America’s official politics than in its residual structures of 
government, its everyday talk of character and community, as well 
as its popular genres (Bellah 1985; Nelson 2003).  As a style, 
republicanism regards government as good, emphasizes citizen 
responsibilities, and seeks personal fulfillment in public affairs.  
This makes for stark contrasts with liberalism, which takes the 
state to be a necessary evil, celebrates citizen rights, and promotes 
personal development in private activities.  Liberalism wants well-
informed citizens who express their interests effectively through 
groups.  Republicanism wants inspirited citizens who recognize 
their interests when articled by leaders.   Knowing with Lord Acton 
that power tends to corrupt, liberals want representative leaders 
regularly elected to keep them accountable to private citizens.  
Knowing with Machiavelli that power tends to disperse, 
republicans want virtuoso leaders able to survive the slings and 
arrows of outrageous fortune. 
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Populism wants charismatic leaders who stand for the little man 
more than any platform of policies.  It often glorifies government 
as a crusade for the common people while demonizing specific 
officials as lackeys of the special interests.  It promises radical 
reform to sweep clean the corridors of power even as it caters to 
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the consumer satisfaction of ordinary citizens.  It favors politicians 
who display a common touch with down-home taste.  These 
leaders are aggressive voices of and for the people.  There are 
populisms of Right and Left, but these are not the liberal politics of 
issue positions and problem solutions.  In other words, they are 
not the politics that most political scientists promote in the 
interest of representative government.  Nor are they the republican 
politics of portentous oratory that dominated early stump speeches 
then carried over into political telespots with rotund voiceovers to 
declaim candidate virtues or opponent vices. 
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In the United States, populism has been more a movement than an 
ideology.  Ad politics that depart from liberalism are seldom 
ideological in a strict sense (Nelson 1998, pp. 205-230).  Unlike 
ideologies, political styles (like republicanism) and movements 
(like populism) do not develop themselves into sciences of 
societies.  Thus modern ideologies offer logics-of-ideas for 
explaining societies and changing policies.  They act indirectly on 
civil society by using modern government as a lever.  Political 
styles and movements instead emphasize direct action by some 
citizens on others within civil society.  They try to alter our 
everyday conduct by changing our ethics, rhetorics, and 
aesthetics.  Yet styles and movements need be no less political 
rationalities for favoring ethics, rhetorics, and aesthetics over idea 
logics.  Even the divergent rationalities of sciences such as 
chemistry, psychology, economics, and ecology can be seen as 
distinctive webs of values, inventions, and emotions (Lakatos 
1970; Feyerabend 1975; Kuhn 1977; Nelson 1987). 
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In emotional terms, liberal rationality is the epitome of modern 
reason:  cool, calm, and collected; serious, sincere, and concerned.  
In voice, consequently, it can sound earnest, wooden, unexcited 
and unexciting.  Populist rationality is emphatically sentimental:  
angry or irritated, sad or scornful, disbelieving or enthusiastic.  In 
voice, populist reason is pointedly ordinary and unpretentious; in 
tone, this means greater variation than can readily be heard from 
(scientific) liberals and (oratorical) republicans.  Populist voices 
are adamant or dramatic, edgy or urgent, indignant or virulent, 
harsh or scolding, friendly or warm.  Considered for its main 
complex of emotions, republican rationality is more formal and 
decorous than the other two.  Typically it is admiring, caring, or 
cheerful; ominous, proud, or solemn.  Accordingly republican 
voices often are authoritative or energetic, reassuring or 
portentous, pretentious or even stern.  Appeals to all three of these 
political rationalities are evident in 2004 presidential spots 
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(Nelson 2004a, 2004b). 
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Thus political ads show how human emotions help form distinct 
rationalities for politics.  This is a reason to open the analysis of 
campaign spots to politics beyond liberal representation of 
interests.  Then we have better opportunities to appreciate the 
emotional appeals in political advertising as potentially legitimate 
and practically essential to its rhetorical work. 
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Theories of public argument typically stress claims, warrants, and 
backings as the units of analysis for public persuasion.  Yet the 
video rhetorics in political spots often work through speech acts 
other than claiming, and these bring emotions emphatically into 
the picture.  Spots make these speech acts with words, but also 
with sights and sounds that position television and film closer to 
oratory and drama than textual modes of public address.  Political 
spots depend on gestures, icons, musics, genres, tones of voice, as 
well as special effects in sound, lighting, and editing that cannot be 
appreciated adequately by turning campaign spots into scripts.  
And even when political spots advance claims, they evidence less 
by means of anecdotes, authorities, statistics, or other devices of 
verbiage than through vicarious and virtual experiences that 
address the full-bodied feelings of citizens.  It is high time for us to 
appreciate the diverse appeals and politics in public arguments of 
all kinds. 
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